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Countries around the world have observed reduced infections from the SARS-CoV-2
virus, that causes COVID-19 illness, primarily due to non-pharmaceutical interventions
(NPIs) such as lockdowns and social distancing measures designed to limit physical
proximity between people. However, economies and societal interactions require
restarting, and so lockdowns cannot continue indefinitely. Therefore, much hope is
placed in using newly developed vaccines as a route back to normality, but this
raises key questions about how they are shared. There are also emerging questions
regarding travel. For instance, international business and trade necessitates at least some
in-person exchanges, alongside restarting travel also for tourist purposes. By utilising
a Susceptible-Infected-Recovered-Vaccinated (SIRV) mathematical model, we simulate
the populations of two nations in parallel, where the first nation produces a vaccine and
decides the extent to which it is shared with the second. Overlaying our mathematical
structure is the virus-related effects of travel between the two nations. We find that even
with extensive travel, nation one minimises its total number of deaths by simply retaining
vaccines, aiming for full inoculation as fast as possible, suggesting that the risks posed by
travel can be mitigated by rapidly vaccinating its own population. If instead we consider
the total deaths i.e., sum of deaths of both nations, then such a policy of not sharing by
nation one until full vaccination is highly sub-optimal. A policy of low initial sharing causes
many more deaths in nation two than lives saved in nation one, raising important ethical
issues. This imbalance in the health impact of vaccination provision must be considered
as some countries begin to approach the point of extensive vaccination, while others
lack the resources to do so.
Keywords: medical ethics, infectious travellers, disease transmission, epidemiology, SARS-CoV-2, COVID-19,
vaccine, SIRV model
1. INTRODUCTION
Through 2020, countries across the world have worked to diminish the impact of the SARS-CoV-
2 virus and lower the related levels of COVID-19 illness (1). Initially, these control measures
have included the implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to keep people
apart, such as “social distancing” policies of limited socialising, or “lockdowns” whereby citizens
are instructed to remain at home. Such measures have been found to be broadly successful (2).
During the Northern Hemisphere Autumn period, there was a lifting of many aspects of lockdown
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across Europe, and societies were encouraged to reopen.
Although some social distancing measures remained in place to
lower transmission, in many instances the predicted possibility
of additional waves of infection (3, 4) occurred. In addition,
there is much confusion over whether it is safe to travel between
nations, resulting in rapidly changing policies of country-
specific travel restrictions because of concerns over importing
infections. Yet in one of the first papers to consider this,
Chinazzi et al. (5) find that restrictions on travel achieve only
small reductions in infections without additional actions to
limit transmission within countries. Travel remains essential in
a world composed of tightly interwoven economies. Exchange
visits remain important between nations that are trading
partners, and hence restrictions are detrimental to business
advancement. COVID-19, as expected, is proving especially
harmful to businesses that support travel, whether for work or
tourism purposes (6).
Toward the end of year 2020, multiple research centres
performed advanced stage trials of potential COVID-19 vaccines
[e.g., (7–9)]. In the United Kingdom for instance, approval
has been given for the vaccines produced by Pfizer/BioNTech
(10), AstraZeneca (11), and Moderna (12). However, vaccine
availability also raises new questions. Should a country discover
a safe vaccine, followed rapidly by mass production, a key
question is how should it be distributed? A reasonable working
assumption is that to reduce infections to levels that would
promote herd immunity and fade-out of disease, a substantial
fraction of inoculations will be given to citizens of the country
that developed the vaccine. If during vaccine production
and distribution, that country (nation “one”) also implements
measures to constrain infections while waiting for everyone to be
vaccinated, then people travelling from another country (nation
“two”) may be a concern. Such concerns will be warranted if
nation two places less emphasis on restricting the spread of
COVID-19. Additionally, the infections of citizens of nation
one are likely to increase as they visit nation two. Hence where
extensive trade-related travel exchanges between nation one and
nation two are critical, a fundamental question is whether it is
prudent for nation one to share vaccines with nation two before
nation one is fully vaccinated. A related question is whether more
lives are saved overall (i.e., considering the combined effect on
nation one and nation two) by the early sharing of vaccines.
Here we use a mathematical representation of virus transmission,
vaccine provision and sharing, and travel between two nations, to
investigate these questions.
2. GOVERNING EQUATIONS
2.1. Infections, Deaths, Vaccinations, and
Inter-Nation Exchange
Our aim is to provide a set of equations that are as simple as
possible, yet retain sufficient complexity that they can describe
three main effects of: (1) infection increases starting from low
case numbers (e.g., after the lifting of lockdown measures), (2)
travel between two nations and any related transfer of infections,
and (3) the effects of different options for vaccine distribution. In
our conceptual modelling framework, we consider two nations,
“one” and “two” indexed by “1” and “2,” respectively, and
with populations N1 and N2 (people). Each nation has a virus
transmission rate β (new infections per day caused by an
infected individual in a completely susceptible population), and
an infected case fatality rate α, which is a fraction of those
currently infected. To account for travel between the two nations,
variable f2 is the fraction of the population of nation two visiting
nation one at any given time. Similarly, for opposite travel, f1 is
the fraction of nation one visiting nation two. Variables f1 and
f2 are considered invariant. The assumption is that the exchange
of people between the two countries, characterised by f1 and f2,
is continuous and so all people will be available in their own
nation at some point to receive any vaccine. We list all model
parameters in Table 1. The simulation framework has some
similarities to modelling different communities within a single
country and during lockdown, such as those who have essential
roles and continued to work, vs. those isolating [e.g., (13)].
Here, we are concerned with continuous travel-based exchange
between communities (i.e., two nations) and in parallel with
vaccine introduction.
We utilise a form of bulk compartmental model to describe
COVID-19 transmission. Such models have proven effective in
modelling the spread of infectious disease for almost a century,
since e.g., (14). Our first equation characterises the number of
susceptibles, S (people) in nation one (S1). The rate of change
of S1 in time t (specified as days since the start of vaccine
production), is given by Equation (1), and has four terms on
the right-hand side. The first describes the number of citizens
of nation one who become infected while located in nation one,
and this includes the impact of increased infection rates due
to visitors from nation two (i.e., the f2I2 term). These people
leave the susceptibility group and enter the infectious group. The
second term is those from nation one, but visiting nation two,
and who become infected while overseas. The third is the re-
entry of those who have recovered from the illness, characterised
by rate of waning immunity, σ (day−1), and where R (people)
is the number who have recovered from COVID-19. A value of
σ = 0 is valid if it is found that those who have recovered from
the virus also have long-term complete immunity. We assume
in our main calculations full immunity (i.e., σ = 0), although
below in numerical results, we also perform a factorial simulation
with a small value σ > 0, based on emerging literature. The
last term is the impact of vaccination. Variable Q (vaccines
day−1) is the total number of vaccinations produced each day,
available for use in either nation one, nation two, or sharing
between the two countries. Available vaccines are assumed to
be used immediately, and distributed according to the fraction
of susceptible people and those who have recovered, R. Hence,
despite strong immunity, we additionally assume that out of
caution, the recovered group is offered and accepts vaccines.
Critically, for the analysis here, quantity ν1(t) is the fraction of
vaccines retained for use by nation one, and that may vary in
time. It is different time histories of this variable, ν1(t), that we
test for their impact in our simulation framework. These equation
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TABLE 1 | Parameters and initial conditions used for our governing Equations (1)–(4) and (7)–(10), and in Figure 1.
Parameter symbol Parameter name Value Units
β1 Daily transmission rate, nation one 0.25 Day
−1
β2 Daily transmission rate, nation two 0.25 Day
−1
f1 Fraction of nation one visiting nation two 0.2
f2 Fraction of nation two visiting nation one 0.2
γ Recovery rate 0.2 Day−1
σ Rate of waning immunity (zero implies continued full immunity) 0.0 Day−1
α Infected case fatality rate 0.005 Day−1
Q Total vaccines produced per day 1 × 106 Vaccines day−1
V1 (0) Initial number of people vaccinated, nation one 0 People
V2 (0) Initial number of people vaccinated, nation two 0 People
S1 (0) Initial number of people susceptible, nation one 49 × 10
6 People
S2 (0) Initial number of people susceptible, nation two 49 × 10
6 People
I1(0) Initial number of people infected, nation one 0.2 × 10
6 People
I2(0) Initial number of people infected, nation two 0.2 × 10
6 People
R1 (0) Initial number of people recovered, nation one 0.8 × 10
6 People
R2 (0) Initial number of people recovered, nation two 0.8 × 10
6 People
Perturbations to these parameters are that f1 = f2 = 0.05 is tested and presented as a sensitivity analysis to less travel in Figure 2. Then in Figures 3B,D, we set β2 = 0.5 as a
sensitivity estimate of nation two having a far higher transmission rate. Further perturbations are made in Supplementary Figures 1–6.
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As susceptible people are infected, they move to the infected
group, I (people). People leave the infected group by recovery as
described by a rate γ (day−1), or by dying and corresponding to
a mortality rate α (day−1). Hence, for nation one, these changes
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]
−γ I1 − αI1. (2)
The inverse of γ is the period, in days, that a person is infectious.
From the value presented in Table 1, this gives a period of 5
days (15). Others suggest longer infection periods of a median
of 8 days (16), or a range of 7–14 days (17). Very early during
the emergence of the COVID-19 illness, it was realised that
approximately one third of infected people show no signs of
illness (18) yet these people can still infect others (19). Such
asymptomatic individuals are included in our I1 and I2 groups,
and so these quantities are not simply people who are unwell.
The recovery group, R, increases in size based on those
who were previously infected and survive. People return to the
susceptible group if there is no lifelong immunity effects or
that immunity is time-limited, as characterised by parameter σ .
People also leave the recovered group if vaccinated. For nation
one, the number of recovered individuals (R1) is:
dR1
dt




Again, it is the last term on the right-hand side of Equation (3)
that captures the assumption noted above, that even when full
immunity is assumed (i.e., σ = 0), a cautious approach is taken
of vaccinating those who have recovered. Finally, the group of




In the set of governing equations for nation one, we assume that
all people are in one group: S, I,R, or V , and so:
N1 = S1 + I1 + R1 + V1. (5)
In Equations (1)–(4), there is a final implicit assumption
that births and non-COVID-19 deaths balance. Hence these
equations, when combined additively, give dN1/dt = −αI1,
which is the excess death rate due to COVID-19 illness. The total
number to have died from COVID-19, D (people), in nation one






For the second nation, then the governing equations are very
similar to those of Equations (1)–(4); the indices are swapped,
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and the fraction of vaccines ν1 is now replaced by 1 − ν1. For





(1− f2)N2 + f1N1
[




f2N2 + (1− f1)N1
[
(1− f1)I1 + f2I2
]








(1− f2)N2 + f1N1
[




f2N2 + (1− f1)N1
[
(1− f1)I1 + f2I2
]
−γ I2 − αI2. (8)
dR2
dt






= (1− ν1)Q. (10)
and with:
N2 = S2 + I2 + R2 + V2. (11)
There is substantial flexibility in the selection of parameters in
our model. Here we restrict the degrees of freedom by holding
most parameters fixed, and as given in Table 1. These values
correspond to similarities in the size of the two nations, relatively
low initial infection rates, and similar death rates. For the analysis
presented here, we primarily focus on the effects of changing the
extent of travel, by altering f1 and f2, alternative transmission
rates β1 and β2, and importantly the impacts of different time-
evolving policies for vaccine sharing, as defined by ν1(t).
2.2. Provision of Vaccines and Their
Sharing
We assume that at time t = 0 a vaccine becomes available, and
a capability exists in nation one to mass produce it from then
onwards. The production rate for t ≥ 0 is Q (vaccines day−1).
The first nation then has a choice, which might evolve in time, as
to the fraction ν1(t) of vaccines to keep for its own country rather
than offering to the second country. The total number vaccinated













Reaching a time when V1 = N1 causes ν1 ≡ 0 for all times
after. This situation is where nation one becomes fully vaccinated,
and all vaccines are made available for nation two thereafter.
Similarly, if V2 = N2, then ν1 ≡ 1 for times after. At time t = τ
(days), then everyone is vaccinated in both nations, i.e., the first
time when both V1 = N1 and V2 = N2. At t = τ we stop the
simulations and total deaths in nation one, D1(τ ), is noted. For
the values of Table 1, then τ ∼ 100 days.
Many strategies can be envisaged for vaccine provision, and
here we initially search for those that minimise the total number
of COVID-19 related deaths for the first nation. That is we look
for vaccine sharing pathways, ν1(t), that satisfy or get near to
satisfying, the condition:
minD1(τ ). (13)
Two approaches to searching for optimum solutions are possible.
The first is noting that the solution of Equations (1)–(4)
and (7)–(10) and discovery of the path ν1(t) that satisfies
Equation (13) is a formal problem in optimal control. This
requires derivation of the adjoint to the governing equations,
following the optimisation approach of Pontryagin’s Maximum
Principle (20), and subsequent calculation of solution for ν1(t),
while also satisfying any constraints. Such constraints include
that 0 ≤ ν1(t) ≤ 1, along with further constraints that ensure
physical realism e.g., that all S, I,R, and V values are positive,
and V ≤ N. The second approach is to instead iterate over
possible pathways in ν1(t), subject to the same constraints, and
determine for each the D1(τ ) value. This latter approach is far
less elegant, and cannot guarantee an overall minimum solution
is found. However, there are some advantages. The iterative
approach may bring more intuition as to which solutions are
particularly sub-optimal, and is easier to implement when there
is a necessity of speed in understanding a research problem
of concern. Furthermore, a single minimum solution does not
necessarily represent an enactable strategy, and of more practical
use can be an understanding of the potential outcomes of a
range of vaccination strategies. We adopt the second numerical
approach, and in particular consider changes to ν1 at discrete
intervals, which may reflect how policy is enforced.
3. NUMERICAL RESULTS
3.1. Effect of Delay Before Vaccine Sharing
We start by considering a policy where nation one retains all
vaccines until a threshold, X (%) of its population are vaccinated.
At that stage, all further vaccines are given to nation two until
they too have X% of their population inoculated. Following
this, all vaccines are used again in nation one until everyone is
vaccinated, after which all further vaccines are given to nation
two.We present numerical calculations for X = 20% in Figure 1.
In Figure 1, the left-hand side panels are time-evolving quantities
for nation one, and the right-hand side for nation two. The
top row shows this policy choice regarding vaccine sharing (i.e.,
X = 20%), and the second row is cumulative deaths. This policy
results in ∼25% fewer deaths in the first nation (annotations
in second row in Figure 1) as calculated at t = τ when both
nations are fully vaccinated. In the next four rows, left column
are the solutions to Equations (1)–(4), and right column to
Equations (7)–(10). In many circumstances, it is the projected
number of infected people (row four of Figure 1) that is of most
interest to health planners, who need to know if the number
of severely ill people may exceed hospital or intensive care unit
capacity. The setting of f1 = f2 = 0.2 (Table 1) corresponds
to extensive inter-nation levels of travel, and this large value is
taken to provide an outer bound in our analysis. Some travel
exchanges have historically been especially large, including for
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FIGURE 1 | Calculations with parameters and initial conditions as given in Table 1, and including for extensive travel with f1 = f2 = 0.2. The left-hand column are
time-evolving projections for nation one and that has developed the vaccine, and right-hand column are for nation two. After 20% of the population of nation one
(Continued)
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FIGURE 1 | are vaccinated, the vaccine is instead used exclusively in nation two. In nation two, 20% of that population is then vaccinated, before returning to fully
vaccinate nation one, and then on to fully vaccinate nation two. The top row presents these vaccine sharing decisions, of ν1 and 1− ν1. For this scenario, the second
row is cumulative deaths (D1 and D2), and with annotations of final death count when both countries are fully vaccinated. The next rows are, respectively, the numbers
of people susceptible to COVID-19 (S1 and S2), infected (I1 and I2), recovered (R1 and R2) and vaccinated (V1 and V2). For each row, the vertical scales are identical to
allow comparison between nation one and nation two.
FIGURE 2 | Deaths for different X values defining vaccine sharing. (A) Total deaths for nation one (red) and nation two (orange), at the time of full vaccination of both
nations. The vaccine sharing policy is the same as that presented in Figure 1, except that here the percentage of nation one vaccinated before sharing, X, is tested
across all percentage values. Hence, for extensive travel exchange with f1 = f2 = 0.2 and with X = 20%, the values shown are identical to the annotated total deaths
in the second row of Figure 1. The continuous lines are for f1 = f2 = 0.2, and the dashed lines are for less travel exchange with f1 = f2 = 0.05. All other parameters
are as given in Table 1. (B) Shows the total deaths, and so is the addition of the nation one and nation two deaths of (A).
instance, tourists to key European countries in summer months,
although these will be from multiple other nations.
We repeat the calculations in Figure 1, for all vaccine
threshold X values, and calculate total deaths in nation one
and nation two (Figure 2). COVID-19 related deaths, marked
as annotations in the second row of Figure 1, are identical to
those at X = 20% (Figure 2; continuous lines). Deaths for
lower travel between countries, with f1 = f2 = 0.05, are
also calculated (Figure 2; dashed lines). The curve minimums
for nation two (Figure 2A) are a consequence of our sharing
framework. For low X values, although nation two receives
vaccines quickly after X% of nation one are inoculated, this
only then vaccinates a small percentage X of nation two, before
nation one continues its immunisation programme. High X
values cause a substantial time to pass before nation two can
start a vaccination programme. Both approaches cause higher
deaths compared to the minimum for nation two. For nation
one, there is relatively little variation in total deaths, irrespective
of the choice of the X value. Total deaths in the donor country
(nation one) are lowest when the country does not share vaccines
(X = 0% and X = 100%), and peak when the switch of
vaccine from donor to recipient country occurs after ∼22% of
the donor population is vaccinated. Lower travel exchanges (i.e.,
f1 = f2 = 0.05) have a protective influence on nation one,
due to fewer imported infections as well as fewer infections by
citizens of nation one when overseas. The effect is the opposite
for nation two, as the lower amount of travel means a smaller
exchange of more infected people from that nation are replaced
with those from nation one who are less infected. In addition,
lower exchanges from nation two to nation one, which has
fewer infections, provides less protection as a smaller number
of nation two susceptible people have travelled. Critically, for
both sets of f values, is that the minimum deaths for nation one
correspond to no initial sharing (i.e., at X = 100%). Hence for
our parameter values, gains by vaccinating people in nation two
to lower imported infections are outweighed by no initial sharing,
and thus vaccinating all of nation one as fast as possible. The
sharing policy by nation one has a much larger impact on deaths
in nation two, raising an important ethical issue. If nation one
only shares vaccines after all its own citizens have first received
it (i.e., X → 100%), then nation two has an especially high total
number of deaths.
A particular interpretation of the minimum of nation two
deaths (Figure 2A) is as follows. For the parameter values
reported in Table 1, the basic reproduction number is R0 =
β/γ = 1.25. A very early assessment of the COVID-19
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basic reproduction number (21) suggests it to have a much
higher value, citing a range of 2.24–3.58, and so implicit in
our transmission values is that they are for a later period with
social distancing measures in place. Our value of 1.25 suggests
that if more than 20% of the population of nation two are
vaccinated (achieved in the first phase of vaccine policy if
X > 10%), then this would make the effective reproduction
number, R (22), fall below unity. After this, besides the beneficial
effects of vaccination, infection numbers would also fall by their
own accord achieving what is sometimes referred to as “herd
immunity.” Although our sharing scenario is slightly contrived
(e.g., top row of Figure 1), for the values presented in Table 1,
the minimum for nation two deaths in Figure 2 implies two
key features. Giving away enough vaccines such that it allows
a nation to have an effective reproduction number substantially
below unity will save many lives. However, giving away many
more vaccines, but waiting a longer period beforehand will result
in more deaths for nation two. For both f values (0.2 and
0.05), we show the combined number of deaths for nation one
and nation two together (Figure 2B). The minimum number of
overall deaths is with an X sharing threshold of order 20–25%.
3.2. Additional Sensitivity Calculations
Reinfection remains a major uncertainty for the COVID-19
illness (23). Hence, as a factorial experiment, we consider
potential non-zero values for immunity waning, σ , after illness.
Seow et al. (24) report that acute immunity wanes as expected,
but longer immunity from immunoglobulin antobodies can
last beyond 94 days. Meanwhile, Dan et al. (25) find that the
percentage of subjects seropositive for spike immunoglobulin,
at 6–8 months post onset of symptoms, was 90%. For our
period of 100 days of simulation, this may be a loss of
around 5%, which can be approximated as σ = 0.0005. We
repeat the calculations leading to Figure 2, but with this new
non-zero value of σ (Supplementary Figure 1). As might be
expected, with this relatively low reported loss of immunity,
deaths (Supplementary Figure 1) are almost indistinguishable
from those for complete immunity (Figure 2).
An additional extension of our analysis is to account for
vaccines that do not have 100% efficacy. If 0 ≤ e ≤ 1 is
efficacy, with for instance a value of e = 0.8 corresponding
to 80% effectiveness, then an easy amendment to our model
is to replace every term Q in all equations with eQ. This very
simplistic characterisation of efficacy would mean thatV remains
the number of vaccinated people, but it only now includes those
with full protection. Hence for e < 1, the infected, susceptible
and recovered groups would be larger compared to if e = 1.
This alteration is valid where the aim of the model structure is
to provide a basic estimate of the number of COVID-19 related
deaths. However, in more complex model structures, for instance
accounting for different less restricted behaviour by people who
are vaccinated, then it may require an additional distinct group
for those who have received a vaccine but remain susceptible.
As a sensitivity study, we perform the simulations presented
in Figure 2 but with Q replaced by eQ and with e = 0.8
(Supplementary Figure 2). We find that the main features of
Supplementary Figure 2 are similar to those of Figure 2, but
the number of deaths for nations one and two, for each X
value, are much higher. Our elementary description of efficacy
implies that a fraction e of those receiving a vaccine cannot
be infected. However, reported vaccine efficacies may involve a
more subtle definition. In particular a vaccine may be regarded
as effective for a fraction e of those inoculated if many in that
fraction still get infected but the implications are avoidance of
serious illness or death. To model this requires a more complex
framework with, for instance, an additional infected group of
people who have been vaccinated Iv, but for whom the fatality
rate αv (day
−1) is much smaller than the non-vaccinated value
α. Models are emerging that sub-compartmentalise the group
infected by COVID19 [e.g., (26)]. An early assessment of the
Oxford AstraZeneca vaccine suggests it to be 70% effective (27)
and the Pfizer vaccine is reported as being 95% effective (28).
Waning of vaccine immunity can also be accounted for as
a further extension of our analysis. In the analysis of vaccine
efficacy, characterised by parameter e, this corresponds to a
fraction, (1 − e), of people for whom the vaccine does not
work from the outset, but all others receiving it have permanent
immunity. To instead model decreasing vaccine immunity, we
introduce a daily fraction of those who have received a vaccine,
but lose immunity, defined by parameter σV (day
−1). We modify
the nation one vaccine group to account for the lowering of
immunity, by adding an extra loss term of −σVV1 to the right
hand side of Equation (4). A balancing gain term of +σVV1 is
added to the susceptible group S1, given by Equation (1). Similar
changes can be made to the nation two equations for V2 and
S2. We again repeat the format of the calculations leading to
Figure 2, but now including this effect in both nations. Here
we imagine the pessimistic scenario whereby new variants cause
vaccine immunity loss over a period of 6 months, suggesting σV
of order 1/180. Hence we set σV = 0.005 (but e = 1), and
as expected, this results in more deaths (up to 20,000) based
on our parameters (Supplementary Figure 3). Our vaccine rate
Q and population sizes are such that by day 100, everyone will
have received a vaccine. In the circumstances of complete vaccine
efficacy (e = 1) and permanent immunity (σV = 0), then deaths
after ourmodelled day 100 will be low. However, with low efficacy
or loss of immunity, and in the absence of emerging and more
effective vaccines, then death rates will remain high after day 100,
adding to the totals shown in our diagrams. If the strength of
waning immunity is similar for both vaccinated people, and for
those in the recovered group after having been ill with COVID-
19, then we simulate this with non-zero values for both σ and σv.
Simulations in Supplementary Figure 4 are identical to those of
Supplementary Figure 3, except that now σ is also non-zero, and
with σ = σv = 0.005. As expected, this creates a further rise in
the number of projected deaths. However, this additional increase
through both effects, compared to only σv set as non-zero
(Supplementary Figure 4 vs. Supplementary Figure 3), is less
than that from introducing the waning vaccine immunity effect
only (Supplementary Figure 3 vs. Supplementary Figure 2).
We also consider the impact of initial conditions, and in
particular if one nation has substantially more infections at the
start of vaccine program. Different infection levels will relate to
the previous history of lockdown and social distancing measures
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FIGURE 3 | Total deaths in both nation one and nation two at the time of complete vaccination of both nations. Each point in the top row corresponds to a single set
of fortnightly policy decisions on vaccine sharing. (A) For parameter values and initial conditions presented in Table 1. (B) Asymmetric case where virus transmission
is more prevalent in nation two, and so with β2 = 0.5. In (B), both axes are scaled identically to highlight the different death rates. The blue dots are where nation one
retains all vaccines (i.e., ν1 ≡ 1) for at least the first three fortnightly periods. In (C), we return to the same parameters and simulations shown in (A), but now show the
total deaths (those of nation one plus nation two), and disaggregated by the mean value of vaccine sharing, ν1 in the first 42 days. The red dots are the mean values
for each “bin” of size 0.1 for ν1, and the vertical lines are ± two standard deviations. (D) Identical to (C), except for the parameter values of (B) i.e., with high virus
transmission in nation two.
within nations. The number of infections at any given time
will also depend on the previous timecourse of the index cases,
which are the initial people who introduce the virus to a nation
(sometimes called “patients zero”).We instead first set nation one
to have I1(0) = 0.5 × 10
6 initial infections, rather than the lower
value of Table 1, and also lower S1(0) by 0.3 × 10
6 accordingly.
We repeat the calculations leading to Figure 2, but with the new
initial condition (Supplementary Figure 5). Again, the salient
features of Figure 2 are retained, but of note is that in particular
for high exchanges f1 = f2 = 0.2, deaths in nation two are
much higher, emphasising the effect of exported infections from
nation one.We similarly adjust initial infections in nation two, by
increasing it to I2(0) = 0.5× 10
6 but keeping all other parameters
as for Table 1. For high exchanges of people (f1 = f2 = 0.2), now
deaths in nation one increase by a large amount due to imported
infections through travel (Supplementary Figure 6).
The finding that to minimise overall deaths requires
early vaccine sharing by nation one (minimum of curves
in Figure 2B) remains valid in our sensitivity studies
(Supplementary Figures 1B–6B).
3.3. A Broad Range of Vaccine Sharing
Policy Options
In a next set of simulations (Figure 3), we scan a much larger
range of possible approaches to vaccine sharing. We assume a
policy decision is made each fortnight, and when nation one
considers changing the value of ν1. At days 1, 15, 29, 43, 57, 71,
and 85, ν1 can be set for the 14 days ahead as either 0.0, 0.2, 0.4,
0.6, 0.8, or 1.0. This policy approach yields 67 potential policy
combinations for a given set of parameters. As previously, these
sharing options are overridden if one country eventually becomes
fully vaccinated, after which all vaccines are used in the other
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nation. For the set of parameters in Table 1, each policy choice is
presented as a dot in Figure 3A. The values (Figure 3A) are the
accumulated COVID-19 related deaths, shown for both nations,
and up to the time of full vaccination in both nations. The slightly
jagged appearance in the spread of solutions is a consequence
of the numerical discretisation associated with the fortnightly
policy decisions. In Figure 3A, any superimposed line of gradient
minus one would correspond to a constant sum of deaths from
combining those of both nation one and nation two. Hence the
curvature in the plume of points again illustrates a potential issue
of ethics. If nation one seeks to minimise its total number of
deaths (low values on “x” axis, Figure 3A), then the gradient of
points (top left of diagram) has a magnitude larger than unity.
As such, every life saved in nation one corresponds to a number
greater than unity of lives lost in nation two. Placing a constraint
on selected policy options that for the first three fortnights,
all vaccines are retained for nation one, corresponds to the
blue dots. In similarities to the scenarios presented in Figure 2,
such initial high retention levels of vaccines correspond to the
lowest cumulative deaths for nation one. This finding suggests
again that for the parameters and policy scenarios presented
here, the hypothesis that sharing vaccines will lower imported
infections and decrease total deaths in nation one cannot be
supported when compared to simply vaccinating nation one as
fast as possible.
We introduce an asymmetry to the parameters by raising the
value of β2 for nation two to 0.5 (Figure 3B). If the infectious
stage of COVID-19 is 5 days [(15) and our Table 1], then with
β2 = 0.5, this corresponds to a R0 value between two and three.
This scenario, whereby transmission occurs twice as frequently
in nation two, provides an outer bound worst case for our
simulations. The new calculations of cumulative total deaths in
both nations, at the time when everyone is inoculated and for
β1 = 0.25 and β2 = 0.5, are shown in Figure 3B. The higher
value of β2, as expected, results in the total deaths in nation two
to be vastly higher than those for when β2 = 0.25. However,
of note is that the deaths in nation one also rises by a large
amount, confirming the effect of extensive travel (here f1 = f2 =
0.2) to and from nation two that has weaker controls on virus
transmission. The blue dots in both panels again correspond to
where, for the first three fortnights, nation one retains all vaccines
(ν1 ≡ 1). To aid illustration, the axis range in Figure 3B for both
nations is identical, showing the gradient of the plume of points
is now even larger. This high gradient implies that any change
in sharing policy that saves additional lives in nation one, will
correspond to substantially more lives lost in nation two, again
raising ethical issues.
To capture more simply the issue of equity, we present
the total number of deaths as a function of initial levels of
vaccine sharing (Figures 3C,D). The simulations and parameters
of Figure 3C are identical to those of Figure 3A, and similarly
Figure 3D uses the same projections as Figure 3B. In Figure 3C,
a symmetry exists as expected with identical parameters for
nation one and nation two, and so the minimum total deaths are
achieved when a half of vaccines are given by nation one to nation
two. Figure 3D illustrates that if we model nation two as having
a higher transmission rate, then the minimum number of total
deaths is when nation one gives away most or all of their vaccines
following the start of their production.
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
4.1. General Findings
We have investigated the role of different policies of vaccine
sharing on managing COVID-19 infections. Our equation set is
designed to model the extent of SARS-CoV-2 virus transmission,
during the period when a vaccine is verified as safe and its mass
production and distribution starts. Two nations are considered
(“one” and “two”), the first of which has discovered and is making
a vaccine, and where there is extensive travel between the two
countries. We create a model framework to ask whether given
travel, it is beneficial for nation one to share vaccines with nation
two to lower imported infections? Equations (1)–(4) and (7)–
(10), in tandem with the parameters and initial conditions of
Table 1, are parameter-sparse, relatively simple, yet capture the
main processes needed to address that question. Our headline
finding is that for the parameters investigated, despite the risks
of imported infection, in order to minimise deaths in nation
one the best strategy is for that nation to vaccinate all citizens
first before subsequently sharing it. This inference is achieved by
iterating numerically over a range of possible sharing strategies.
However as expected, lower levels of travel with nation two which
has more infections, decreases the number of COVID-19-related
deaths in nation one. We recognise the hardship that reduced
travel causes, and especially for those with employment in the
tourism and hospitality sector. The solutions presented reveal
that although some vaccine sharing will likely mean more deaths
in nation one, it can cause a disproportionately large saving of
lives in nation two. This finding raises obvious ethical issues
regarding vaccine distribution. As any particular nation becomes
increasingly inoculated, vaccines may then save many more lives
by being sent elsewhere.
As a nation starts to achieve a high number of inoculations,
reaching herd immunity, then more lives will still be saved with
further vaccination. However, at this point, the probability of
a life saved per vaccine administered will be higher if it used
elsewhere, in a location with little or no vaccine coverage. Vaccine
sharing, as a positive externality to infection dynamics, may
set up complex issues in control infections and elasticity. Such
elasticity is where the prevalence of infection changes the levels
of vaccination uptake (29, 30). High elasticity provides self-
interested individuals with less incentive to be vaccinated as
coverage increases, as they expect to gain from herd immunity.
Hence it may become increasingly difficult to minimise the
prevalence of infections, and therefore associated deaths, due to
COVID-19 in the nation that developed the vaccine. In these
circumstances, with a stalling of vaccine uptake, then extensive
sharing is likely to achieve further benefits in the first nation
by managing overall risks of mortality associated with the virus.
Sharing will reduce risks of imported infections where there is
substantive travel with other nations.
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4.2. Caveats
The modelling framework used in this study is not exempt from
caveats and limitations. For instance, we have not explored where
two nations have markedly different populations and so S1(0)
and S2(0) are dissimilar. The fractions of nations travelling,
given by f1 and f2, may also not balance, for instance should
one country be a popular tourist destination. Temporary self-
quarantining of people after travel, possibly in tandem with
raised testing regimes (e.g., at airports), will lower levels of
imported infections, and these effects would require adjustment
to our equations. In addition, some parameters may not be
fixed in time. For instance, the number of vaccines that can
be produced per day may grow substantially in time, making
Q time-dependent. Arguably, any nation seeing the benefits of
vaccination causing immunity may choose to simultaneously
work to lower transmission rate further (i.e., make β a function
of time), as part of a push to completely remove the virus as fast
as possible. A further caveat is that our equations do not include
any within-country compartmentalisation of populations, noting
others conclude that vaccine priority should be for those at
greater risk, such as the elderly and the immune-compromised
(31, 32). The assumption of complete or high immunity for
those who recover from COVID-19 remains an open scientific
question. Investigating more extreme parameter ranges or policy
optionsmay yet find that the best solution, in terms of cumulative
deaths of nation one, is some early vaccine sharing. Our flexible
mathematical structure may be applicable at more local scales
within countries, to understand different policies for major
cities and between which substantial travel occurs. In the other
direction, the simulation structure is available to extension to
understand interactions between more than two countries.
A further caveat is that we do not account for any
fraction of infected individuals who, upon realising they are
unwell and suspect (correctly) they have COVID-19, decide
to not travel. If a is the fraction of infected people who
plan to travel, and still travel, then this would likely also
include the sizeable number of people with COVID-19 who
are asymptomatic. Inclusion of this effect would modify,
for instance, Equation (1) for susceptible people in nation
one, to instead be as given as Supplementary Equation (1).
In the instance where nation two has high infection levels,
then the implication for those susceptible in nation one of
less travel by unwell people (i.e., by a lower a value) in
Supplementary Equation (1) is as follows. The first right-
hand term of Supplementary Equation (1) will be affected
mainly by the last component, with af2I2 replacing f2I2
in Equation (1). This change implies that fewer infected
people will travel from nation two to nation one, lowering
imported infections. However, such suppression of travel by
this mechanism will have less effect on the second right-hand
term of Supplementary Equation (1), which describes the risk of
infection by f1S1 susceptibles (i.e., non-infected people) in nation
one travelling to nation two.
A major ongoing concern of the COVID-19 crisis is the
emergence of virus variants (e.g. in Brazil, India, United
Kingdom and South Africa), and that might be vaccine resistant,
have higher transmission levels, or both. For instance, the Delta
variant first found in India may have more vaccine resistance
(33). If a new variant becomes the dominant strain, then our
framework can accommodate this by different vaccine efficacy
e, waning vaccine immunity σv, and transmission β parameter
values. If reducing overall virus infection globally lowers the risk
worldwide of new variants of concern emerging, then this relates
to vaccine sharing should some policies lower overall infection
levels more than others.
More complexity can be added to our simulation framework
by configurations that consider variation in transmissibility and
susceptibility within the populations of nations. Distinctions may
be defined by age-dependent variation in social mixing (34) and
mortality, clinically vulnerable vs. non-vulnerable, or variation in
existing medical conditions that may partially depend on poverty
levels. Specific vaccine rollout plans may also be modelled, such
as prioritising vaccinations to frontline health workers who will
have much higher levels of interactions with infected individuals.
Such variations would require substantial additional parameters
(mortality levels and inter-group infection transmission rates)
and model compartments, all requiring quantification. More
generally, whilst many countries have focussed on vaccinating
the eldest first, as they are considered more vulnerable, the
COVID-19 crisis raises other issues of inter-generational equity.
For instance, younger people may be disproporitionately affected
by unemployment, post-COVID-19 national debt burdens, and
research is needed to see if they are particularly impacted by
mental health issues caused by lockdowns (35). The order of
within-country vaccination of groups may affect these factors, for
instance, by inoculating some groups faster to enable return to
full employment. The issue of elasticity in vaccine uptake is also
not included in our equations.
The equations presented and their solution to find a vaccine
sharing policy that minimises deaths is amenable to the
application of optimal control theory. Such methods have been
successful in informing public health strategies regarding the
avian influenza pandemic (36), the Chikungunya epidemic (37),
and influenza (38). Optimal control has also been used in terms
of minimising the cost of vaccine programmes, for human
papillomavirus (HPV) (39) and influenza (40), and sometimes
in tandem with other disease prevention methods e.g., mosquito
control for dengue (41). Optimal control methods are elegant,
ultimately the most appropriate mathematically, and provide a
level of verification unachieveable by scanning numerically for
a solution. We plan to undertake such analyses, solving the
governing equations and additionally the adjoint, as required
by optimal methods, along with satisfying constraints to ensure
physical realism. However, our more fast-track initial “forward-
mode” computation approach does have some advantages. We
restricted ourselves to discrete periods of time between policy
changes, potentially reflecting how decisions are undertaken with
regular reviews. The discrete changes could, though, be used to
approximate any smooth time-evolving trajectories discovered
for ν1(t) by optimal techniques.
4.3. Overall Summary
Our analysis represents two countries of similar size and levels
of visitation rates, and where we set transmission rates to values
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that might reflect the on-going implementation of NPIs such
as the use of lockdowns, personal protection equipment, and
social distancing. The mass production and use of vaccines
is considered to start at the beginning of our simulations.
We assume that using a general SIRV (Susceptible, Infected,
Recovered, Vaccinated) model is valid to describe the spread
of COVID-19 illness. For our selected parameters and range
of policy options, we find that reducing travel and keeping all
vaccines until full inoculation will minimise COVID-19 related
deaths in a nation (nation one) that produces a vaccine. Our
initial hypothesis was that when accounting for travel, it is
beneficial for nation one to share vaccines with nation two, to
lower either imported infections, or infection risk when visiting
nation two. For our selected default parameters, this effect
appears relatively small. However, the extent of travel affects
nation two more, as for example with larger exchanges, people
of nation two are more protected when visiting nation one. If
either nation has a higher initial infection level at the start of a
vaccine program, as expected, travel will cause more deaths in
the other nation.
What our calculations do highlight is the strong influence
that any vaccine sharing policy has on the total deaths of nation
one and two combined. In particular, to minimise deaths overall,
nation one needs to offer nation two a substantial number of
vaccines, and early on. In some instances, extensive sharing may
result in only small increases in deaths in nation one (the vaccine
producer), yet save a much larger number of lives in nation two.
This finding also remains valid for the sensitivity calculations
we performed and report. Early and sizeable vaccine sharing
raises an ethical dilemma. Should the government of a nation
producing a vaccine make their primary role to inoculate as
fast as possible all those who have elected it, or to take a more
global perspective, and share earlier on vaccines to save more
lives overall? The issue of vaccine sharing and related ethics
is likely to require substantial thought in the months ahead.
Indeed, as of the beginning of year 2021, there has already been
tension between the European Union and the United Kingdom
on this matter. Although a very obvious point to make, it is
worth reiterating that with the emergence of vaccines, deaths will
be minimised by achieving its largest possible mass production.
High production levels will most quickly vaccinate the country
of its origin, and enable more rapid and substantial sharing
internationally. As vaccines are now receiving approval as safe,
our model framework can be used in a more operational context,
entraining known parameters specific to individual countries.
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